Institutional economics objectives of MPEI
Replenishment date: 10.11.2015
Content: 229_instual economy_tasks.doc (469.5 KB)
️Automatic issue of goods ✔️
️Automatic issue of goods ✔️
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Description
Task No. 1
Determine the value of the value of the good for the individual Y with the optimal amount of production of the group good, if Vg = 100T2-50 = 850, and C = 10T2 + 25 = 115.
Task No. 2
You need to determine the cost-effective scale of the firm. Will there be and, if so, how will your decisions differ depending on the theory of the firm chosen for the analysis. What size would the firms be with zero transaction costs, 10 units / transaction, 100 units / transaction? What organizational form would be acceptable? Justify your answer.
Task No. 3
What should be the change in costs to ensure the production of a collective good in the production of an optimal amount of a group good, if the part of the total benefit that goes to the individual is 0,2, and the group benefit function Vg = 12,5T2 + 100
Task No. 4
You are trying to invest in country N. Benefits from the project are 35 million USD, and losses in case of opportunistic behavior - 5 million USD. Sociological research has allowed you to assess the level of trust in this country. Which indicators of the likelihood that people can be trusted will be acceptable for the implementation of an investment project, and which are not. What investment projects will be available to you? Give examples. What informal institutions exist that you would pay attention to when implementing the project. Justify your answer.
Task No. 5
You are the organizer of an auction for the sale of land ownership, and your income depends on the amount of transactions. What actions of the state can increase and what can reduce your income. Is the Williamson (managerial weakness) model applicable to the analysis of this situation? Justify your answer.
Task No. 6
Imagine that you are a member of a lobbying group. As a result of your actions, you can receive income in the amount of 250 rubles. What should be the minimum and maximum size of your group, if the benefits and costs are distributed equally to everyone, and the last (costs) are equal to 000 rubles. Does it make sense to create a distributive coalition at all. Justify your answer analytically and graphically.
Task No. 7
Any car enthusiast, when driving in a heavy traffic, is faced with the following dilemma. On the one hand, he is obliged to comply with the requirements of the Road Traffic Regulations governing overtaking. The driver who starts overtaking must make sure that “upon completion of the overtaking he will be able to return to the previously occupied lane without interfering with the overtaken vehicle” (Art. 1 II). "The driver of the overtaken vehicle is prohibited from preventing overtaking by increasing the speed or by other actions" (Art. II3) 78. On the other hand, the common practice of "undercutting" is when other drivers "wedge in" between the driver who does not prevent overtaking and the vehicle in front, gradually pushing back the law-abiding driver. To completely get rid of cases of "undercutting", what should be the number of traffic police officers per 1 drivers (taking into account the fact that the probability that they will authorize the facts of "undercutting" is 0,25)?
Determine the value of the value of the good for the individual Y with the optimal amount of production of the group good, if Vg = 100T2-50 = 850, and C = 10T2 + 25 = 115.
Task No. 2
You need to determine the cost-effective scale of the firm. Will there be and, if so, how will your decisions differ depending on the theory of the firm chosen for the analysis. What size would the firms be with zero transaction costs, 10 units / transaction, 100 units / transaction? What organizational form would be acceptable? Justify your answer.
Task No. 3
What should be the change in costs to ensure the production of a collective good in the production of an optimal amount of a group good, if the part of the total benefit that goes to the individual is 0,2, and the group benefit function Vg = 12,5T2 + 100
Task No. 4
You are trying to invest in country N. Benefits from the project are 35 million USD, and losses in case of opportunistic behavior - 5 million USD. Sociological research has allowed you to assess the level of trust in this country. Which indicators of the likelihood that people can be trusted will be acceptable for the implementation of an investment project, and which are not. What investment projects will be available to you? Give examples. What informal institutions exist that you would pay attention to when implementing the project. Justify your answer.
Task No. 5
You are the organizer of an auction for the sale of land ownership, and your income depends on the amount of transactions. What actions of the state can increase and what can reduce your income. Is the Williamson (managerial weakness) model applicable to the analysis of this situation? Justify your answer.
Task No. 6
Imagine that you are a member of a lobbying group. As a result of your actions, you can receive income in the amount of 250 rubles. What should be the minimum and maximum size of your group, if the benefits and costs are distributed equally to everyone, and the last (costs) are equal to 000 rubles. Does it make sense to create a distributive coalition at all. Justify your answer analytically and graphically.
Task No. 7
Any car enthusiast, when driving in a heavy traffic, is faced with the following dilemma. On the one hand, he is obliged to comply with the requirements of the Road Traffic Regulations governing overtaking. The driver who starts overtaking must make sure that “upon completion of the overtaking he will be able to return to the previously occupied lane without interfering with the overtaken vehicle” (Art. 1 II). "The driver of the overtaken vehicle is prohibited from preventing overtaking by increasing the speed or by other actions" (Art. II3) 78. On the other hand, the common practice of "undercutting" is when other drivers "wedge in" between the driver who does not prevent overtaking and the vehicle in front, gradually pushing back the law-abiding driver. To completely get rid of cases of "undercutting", what should be the number of traffic police officers per 1 drivers (taking into account the fact that the probability that they will authorize the facts of "undercutting" is 0,25)?
Additional Information
Task No. 8"Inspection control"
Suppose the owner of one of the city's restaurants turns to you for help: he wants to increase the attractiveness of his restaurant among the visitors. The attractiveness of a restaurant largely depends on the quality of the waiters' work: how fast they work, how they communicate with customers. And the income of its owner depends on the attractiveness of the restaurant. In this regard, the owner of the restaurant hired an administrator whose duties include monitoring the actions of the waiters. Permanent control is associated with costs for the administrator (walking around the hall, making sure that the waiters comply with the established rules, helping them if necessary) in the amount of e. If he fulfills his duties, the visitors are satisfied with the restaurant, and the owner receives income in the amount of R. If the administrator works poorly, the waiters do not follow the rules, they are rude to customers, they work slowly, the restaurant owner's income will be only r, r <R. To prevent this from happening, the restaurant owner can check the administrator's work, but monitoring will also be associated with costs in size m. The administrator receives a fixed salary w rubles per month (in all cases, except for the situation when during the check the owner found that he was not working well).
The task:
1. Build a game matrix that describes the interactions between the restaurant owner and the administrator.
2. At what ratio of parameters in this game will the Nash equilibrium be established in pure strategies? Why will it look like this?
3. At what ratio of parameters in this game does not
becomes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies?
4. With the ratio of parameters found in paragraph 3, find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (graphically, through similar triangles, and analytically). Give an interpretation to the results obtained: how (and why) the probability of the owner's choice of a strategy to control and the probability of the administrator choosing a strategy to work depend on the parameters R, r, w, e, m?
5. If in order to check the administrator, the owner does not have to come to the restaurant, but he can, for example, distribute a questionnaire to the restaurant visitors and ask them to evaluate the work of the administrator and waiters, ie. monitoring costs will be reduced, how will this affect the balance? Why?
6. If the restaurant owner has opened an additional room,
and administrator costs have increased, how will this affect the equilibrium? Why?
7. If there are enough restaurants in the district, and the hack of the administrator leads to a complete loss of customers and zero income for the owner, how will this affect the balance? Why?
Task No. 9
"Moral risk"
The director of the MoBMu company decides to hire a promoter to attract visitors to the cafe. For this, the promoter is given a special costume in the shape of a cow, in which he walks along the street not far from the cafe and invites passers-by to go there. The promoter can either work well, stopping as many passers-by as possible on the street, or work poorly, standing modestly on the sidelines. The promoter's utility function is:
cewewU −− = 20),
where w is the promoter's salary, e is the level of effort in interacting with passers-by, c is the cost of communicating with unfriendly passers-by, which take the value 1 if the promoter tries to stop as many passers-by as possible, and the value 0 if he prefers to stand on the sidelines. It is also known that a promoter can refuse a contract with the MoBMu company and go to distribute leaflets in the subway, getting an alternative utility 35 = U from such work.
The relationship between the revenue (R) of the MuBmu company and the efforts of the promoter is presented in the table of probabilities. MoBMu's revenue. The level of the promoter's efforts R1 = 20 R2 = 40 e = 2 0,2 0,8 e = 0 0,8 0,2
The task:
1. Draw the graphs of the utility functions of the MoBMu company and the promoter in the wBU axes. What is their attitude to risk? Explain the answer.
2. Draw the game tree.